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Recent research has shown that women shy away from competition more often than men. 
We evaluate experimentally three alternative policy interventions to promote women in 
competitions: Quotas, Preferential Treatment, and Repetition of the Competition unless a 
critical number of female winners is reached. We find that Quotas and Preferential Treatment 
encourage women to compete significantly more often than in a control treatment, while 
efficiency in selecting the best candidates as winners is not worse. The level of cooperation 
in a post-competition teamwork task is even higher with successful policy interventions. 
Hence, policy measures promoting women can have a double dividend. 
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1. Introduction 
Despite improvements over the past decades, there are still substantial gender 
differences on labor markets, such as women lagging behind men with respect to wage levels 
or opportunities for career advancement (see, for example, Blau and Kahn, 2000; Bertrand 
and Hallock, 2001; Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer, 2007; Blau, Ferber and Winkler, 
2010). These gender differences are often attributed to differences in preferences, problems in 
combining family and career, or also to discrimination against women (see, e.g., Altonji and 
Blank, 1999; Goldin and Rouse, 2000; Black and Strahan, 2001). A recent line of research has 
highlighted another important factor, namely a lower level of competitiveness of women 
(Gneezy, Niederle and Rustichini, 2003; Gneezy and Rustichini, 2004; Datta Gupta, Poulsen 
and Villeval, 2005; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007, 2010; Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Gneezy, 
Leonard and List, 2009; Wozniak, Harbaugh and Mayr, 2010). These studies provide 
evidence that men increase their performance under competition more than women
1 and that 
women more often opt out of competition, even when they are equally qualified. As a 
consequence of these gender differences in competitiveness, women may get fewer promotion 
opportunities and subsequently lower wages than men. 
Affirmative action programs are intended to promote women to overcome these 
disadvantages on labor markets. A very recent paper by Niederle, Segal and Vesterlund 
(2009) has investigated in a carefully designed laboratory experiment gender differences in 
competitiveness and how they are affected by an affirmative action program that guarantees a 
minimum percentage of women among the winners of a tournament with multiple winners. 
Niederle et al. (2009) have found that their affirmative action policy induces women to enter a 
competition (in a simple math task of adding two-digit numbers) much more often than in a 
control treatment without any policy to promote women. Interestingly, affirmative action had 
no negative effects on the efficiency of the tournament in selecting the best qualified 
candidates as winners since it encouraged in particular entry by high-performing women.
2 
In this paper we present an experimental study that adds to the literature on gender 
differences in competitiveness and the effects of policy interventions in two ways: First, we 
evaluate and compare three alternative types of policy interventions to promote women in 
                                                            
1 Dreber, von Essen and Ranehill (2009), however, do not find men to increase their performance under 
competition more than women do in a study with Swedish school children. They argue that one reason for the 
lack of a gender difference might be the very egalitarian treatment of men and women in the Swedish society. 
2 Calsamiglia, Franke and Rey-Biel (2010) have reported that another form of affirmative action – extending 
preferential treatment to a group of disadvantaged subjects by giving them extra points in a sudoku-solving 
task – has had no negative effects either on the tournament’s efficiency in selecting the best candidates as 
winners. Their study with 10-12 year old schoolchildren is not concerned with gender differences in 
competitiveness, though.   2
competitions: (A) Quotas that guarantee a certain minimum fraction of winners to be female, 
thus making the competition more gender-specific for women. For instance, many European 
parliaments have quotas on parliamentary seats that are reserved for women. (B) Repetition of 
the Competition if a critical number of female winners is not reached in the first attempt. For 
instance, in competitions for academic jobs (and more generally for jobs in the public sector) 
in Austria it is possible that the process of filling a vacant position is completely nullified and 
reset to the start if no woman is shortlisted for the position. This is essentially equivalent to 
repeating the competition then. (C) Preferential treatment of women by increasing their 
objective performance through adding a gender-specific bonus. Preferential treatment 
schemes are often encountered in practice, both in the public and the private sector, as a 
means to increase the participation of women in leading positions. A weak form of 
preferential treatment can be a tie-breaking rule that always favors women in case of equal 
performance or qualifications. In a stronger form, preferential treatment may imply 
discrimination against better-performing men. While policy intervention (A) has been studied 
by Niederle et al. (2009) and policy intervention (C) has been addressed by Calsamiglia et al. 
(2009) – however the latter not in the context of gender differences in competitiveness – we 
are able to compare in a unified framework the different types of interventions and their 
effects on behavior and on the efficiency in selecting the best candidates. 
Second, we examine how the different policy interventions affect behavior after the 
competition. Competition within firms often means that one member of a workgroup receives 
a promotion, but that he or she still needs to work together with the other group members 
afterwards. Policy interventions in the spirit of affirmative action programs might backfire 
after a competition has been concluded by spoiling the willingness of losers to contribute to 
the group and coordinate efficiently in subsequent tasks. If losers perceive particular policy 
interventions as unfair they might be tempted to withhold effort in tasks where the whole 
group benefits from each single member’s contribution or they might obstruct efficient 
coordination with others in coordination tasks. We study post-competition behavior in groups 
by letting our subjects perform two different tasks – a team task and a coordination game – 
after the competition has ended and its winners have been announced. The two tasks represent 
two different production functions in companies. In the team task each group member’s 
output can be perfectly substituted by another member’s output. This gives rise to problems of 
shirking in the spirit of Holmstrom (1982). Taking a minimum effort game as the coordination 
game implies a production function that determines a group’s output by the minimum output 
in the group (for which reason the game is also known as weakest-link game). Coordination   3
problems abound in companies, such as showing up for meetings on time or not, sharing 
information with others or not, etc. (see Brandts and Cooper, 2006; Charness and Jackson, 
2007). Our analysis of post-competition efficiency is, to our knowledge, the first attempt to 
investigate the possibility that policies aimed at promoting women in competition may impact 
on efficiency after the process of competition has been concluded. 
Studying the effects of different policy interventions on competitive behavior of men 
and women – both in the course of a competition as well as after it – seems important for 
companies and politicians alike. Of course, companies and their human resource departments 
have a general interest in selecting the best candidates for a job, irrespective of gender. 
However, the gender composition of a company’s workforce can have implications for the 
company’s success (see, e.g., Weber and Zulehner, 2010). Therefore, companies may want to 
consider the gender of competitors in various ways, and also how different policies affect 
post-competition behavior. Likewise, politicians may want to provide an institutional and 
legal framework for a level-playing field of men and women on labor markets. This requires 
comparing different alternative measures and their effects on behavior and efficiency. In this 
paper we provide controlled laboratory evidence on the behavioral consequences and the 
efficiency of different intervention schemes to promote women in competitions. 
In our experiment we had 360 participants. The experimental task was to add two-digit 
numbers without using calculators.
3 The key parts of our design were a stage where 
participants could choose whether to compete against others with a tournament payment-
scheme or opt for a piece-rate scheme, and two stages in which group members were exposed 
to incentives for shirking and problems of coordination in non-competitive tasks. 
We find that all policy interventions to promote women in the competition (Quota, 
weak and strong Preferential Treatment, and Repetition of the Competition) have a positive 
impact on the proportion of women who choose to engage in competition, although the effect 
is not significant in case of Repetition of the Competition. Preferential treatment appears to 
generate the strongest incentives for women to compete. We estimate the impact of alternative 
policies on the actual and perceived probabilities of winning the tournament and – controlling 
for these probabilities – we find no significant residual gender effect on competition entry 
choices once any of the policy interventions applies. This evidence suggests that the policy 
interventions remove the gender differences in competition entry decisions (that are still 
                                                            
3 The reason for choosing this math task is not only that we follow the earlier literature (Niederle and Vesterlund, 
2007; Niederle et al., 2009), but also because math test scores serve as a good predictor of future income (see, 
e.g., Murnane et al., 2000; Weinberger, 2001).   4
found in a control treatment) through affecting the (perceived and actual) probabilities of 
winning. In fact, we find that changes in the probabilities of winning account fully for the 
different entry choices across policies, so that there is no significant residual impact of policy 
on entry choices either. The only exception to the latter finding is the overreaction of women 
to the strong preferential treatment. The higher entry rates for women – combined with the 
fact that policy interventions have only a weak and insignificant negative effect on men’s 
entry choices – ensure that the different policy interventions do not have a negative effect on 
the competition’s efficiency in selecting the most qualified participants as winners. This result 
confirms under a unified framework the earlier findings by Niederle et al. (2009) and 
Calsamiglia et al. (2009) for particular policies. Studying different policies in the same 
experimental environment here reveals that all policy interventions lead to the same level of 
efficiency in selecting winners. 
Our results with respect to post-competition behavior and efficiency show that 
implementing any of our four different policies does not have a negative effect on a group’s 
performance in a coordination game and a team task. In fact, in the treatments with a policy 
intervention we find a significantly better performance in the team task in comparison to a 
control treatment. This finding implies that policy interventions to promote women in 
competitions do not only increase women’s willingness to enter competition, but they may 
even be useful for a working group’s performance after the competition. We consider this a 
possible double dividend of affirmative action programs. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we introduce the 




2. Experimental design 
We used the experimental design of Niederle et al. (2009) as our point of departure 
and modified it along two dimensions, namely the number of policy interventions studied in 
different treatments and the introduction of post-competition stages. All experimental 
treatments described below share the following characteristics: At the beginning of the 
experiment subjects were randomly assigned into groups of six persons with three men and 
three women each. These groups stayed together for the whole duration of the experiment. All 
groups went through six different stages in the experiment. While subjects knew from the 
beginning that there would be six stages (see the experimental instructions in the appendix),   5
each stage was only introduced and explained after the previous one had been finished. The 
fact that there were fixed groups of six members was only announced after Stage 1. The 
experimental task in each of the stages 1 to 5 was adding five two-digit numbers in a limited 
time period of three minutes. Subjects were not allowed to use calculators, but could use 
scratch paper or do it off the top of their head. After each calculation subjects were informed 
whether their solution was correct or not, and then the next task was shown. The experimental 
task in stage 6 was a simple coordination game that is described more precisely as we explain 
the separate stages in what follows. 
Stage 1 – Piece rate: Each subject received €0.50 for each calculation that was 
correctly solved within the limit of three minutes. This payment was independent of the other 
group members’ performance. 
Stage 2 – Tournament: In this stage group members had to compete against each 
other. The two members who had solved the most calculations correctly were paid €1.50 for 
each of them. The other four group members received nothing. 
Stage 3 – Choice: Every group member could choose whether (s)he wanted to solve 
the calculations under a piece rate scheme (as in Stage 1) or a tournament scheme. If the 
tournament was chosen, then a subject’s performance was compared to the other group 
members’ performance in Stage 2
4 and the rules for determining the winners differed across 
treatments as follows: 
1.  Control treatment (CTR): The winners were the two group members with the largest 
numbers of correct calculations, regardless of gender. Ties were broken randomly, as 
in all other treatments. 
2.  Repetition of the competition (REP): If there was not at least one woman among the 
two winners, the competition was repeated once. In this case, the rules of the repeated 
competition were the same as in the control treatment. Hence, gender played no longer 
any role if the competition had to be repeated. 
3.  Minimum Quota (QUO):
5 Irrespective of the ordinal ranking of group members’ 
performances, there had to be at least one woman among the two winners of the 
                                                            
4 Using the other group members’ past performance has several advantages. First, tournament entry decisions do 
not depend on a subject’s expectation about the other members’ entry decisions, but only on the subject’s 
beliefs about her/his own ability. Second, Stage 2 performances are competitive performances, and thus a 
subject competes against others when they were also exposed to a competitive payment scheme. Third, 
entering competition does not impose externalities on others. In principle, this means that Stage 3 is an 
individual decision making problem. Note that this scheme also implies that it is possible that all group 
members entering the competition in Stage 3 may win or all lose since they are competiting against the others’ 
performance in Stage 2. 
5 This treatment is called the Affirmative Action (AA) treatment in Niederle et al. (2009).   6
tournament. This implied that the best performing woman was a winner for sure. The 
second winner could either be a man – if he performed better than all other men and 
better then the second-best woman – or a woman – if the second-best woman 
performed better than all men. 
4.  Preferential Treatment 1 (PT1): Each woman’s performance was automatically 
increased by one unit (i.e., one correct calculation). Using the augmented scores for 
women, the rules of the control treatment applied, meaning that there were no further 
restrictions on the gender composition of the two winners. 
5.  Preferential Treatment 2 (PT2): Here each woman received two extra units as a 
head-start. Other than that the rules of PT1 applied. 
Note that all treatments were run in a between-subjects design. So each participant 
only experienced one particular payment scheme if the tournament was chosen in Stage 3. It 
is also important to stress that subjects did not receive any feedback on the outcome of the 
compulsory competition in Stage 2 or the optional competition in Stage 3 until the very end of 
the experiment. This was done in order to avoid that subjects condition their choices on 
previous outcomes of a competition. At the end of Stage 3 we elicited the beliefs of all 
subjects regarding their relative performance and their ranks in Stages 1 and 2. For each stage 
subjects had to indicate their expected rank within the whole group of six members, but also 
within their own gender only. Correct guesses were rewarded with €1 each, and the feedback 
was given also only at the end of the experiment. 
Stage 4 – Compulsory tournament with policy intervention from Stage 3: In this 
stage the same treatments as in Stage 3 applied. However, subjects were forced to compete, 
and hence could not opt out as in Stage 3. As before, the two winners received €1.50 for each 
correct calculation. At the end of Stage 4 we informed subjects about the outcome of the 
competition in Stage 4 before moving on to the two non-competitive tasks in Stages 5 and 6. 
This means that each subject found out the gender of the two winners in the group (who were 
identified by means of an identification code that included an “F” for females and an “M” for 
males – see the instructions). In order to make winning and losing in Stage 4 more salient we 
gave each winner in Stage 4 an additional €5 as initial endowment in Stages 5 and 6, and each 
loser only €2. Our purpose was to introduce a clear distinction between winners and losers 
before starting with the post-competition stages. 
Stage 5 – Team task: This task was identical in all treatments. Subjects had to add up 
two-digit numbers again. However, the payment scheme was such that each correct 
calculation was worth €0.50 for the group in total and then split equally among all group   7
members. Hence, the individual payoff from solving one calculation was only €0.083, rather 
than €0.50 as in the piece rate scheme, increasing the incentives to shirk and reduce effort in 
this task. We use the total group performance in Stage 5 in order to evaluate the impact of 
different policy interventions on a group’s joint performance after a competition within the 
group has been concluded. While the monetary incentives are identical in Stage 5 across all 
treatments, the different experiences in Stage 4 might affect Stage 5-behavior in different 
ways. 
Stage 6 – Coordination game: Each group member played the two-person 
coordination game illustrated in Table 1 with each of the other five group members. The so-
called minimum effort game shown in Table 1 has 7 Nash-equilibria that are Pareto-ranked 
along the diagonal. Before picking a number from 1 to 7 a subject was informed about the 
gender of the other player (through the identification code) and whether this player had won 
or lost in the Stage 4-competition. With this information, each subject had to choose five 
times a number (which could be different, of course) for the interaction with each of the other 
group members. All decisions were made simultaneously and feedback was only given after 
Stage 6. Payments were determined by randomly forming three pairs in a group of six 
members and each subject was then paid according to the decisions made in his/her pair. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
The experiment was run computerized with z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007) at the 
University of Innsbruck in October and November 2009. Using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004), we 
recruited 360 students from various academic backgrounds. We ran four sessions for each of 
our five treatments, with 18 subjects (i.e., three groups of six) in each session. This yields 12 
groups with six members in each treatment. In half of the sessions in each treatment we let 
subjects play Stage 6 before Stage 5 in order to control for possible order effects of the team 
task and the coordination game. However, no order effects were found, allowing us to pool 
the data. In order to avoid wealth effects, one stage among Stages 1 to 4 and one stage among 
Stages 5 and 6 were randomly selected for payment at the end of the experiment. The flat 
payment of €5 (€2) for winners (losers) in Stage 4 was paid for sure. Each subject also 
received a show-up fee of €3. Our sessions lasted about 60 minutes and the average payoff per 
subject was €18. 
 
   8
3. Results 
3.1. Performance in Stages 1 and 2 
Figure 1 presents the average performance as number of correctly solved calculations 
across Stages 1 to 5. On average, men perform better than women. While the difference is not 
significant in the piece rate scheme of Stage 1 (6.44 vs. 6.02), men perform significantly 
better in the compulsory competition of Stage 2 (7.53 vs. 6.82; p < 0.05, two-sided Mann-
Whitney U-test). The increase in performance from Stage 1 to Stage 2 is probably due to 
competition applying in Stage 2, although parts of this increase might also be driven by 
learning effects, since Figure 1 indicates an upward trend in performance. Note that the 
increase in performance is larger for men (+17%) than for women (+13%), but the difference 
is not significant. Table 2 presents the average performance (and its standard deviation) by 
gender for all five treatments. Controlling for gender, both in Stage 1 and Stage 2 there are no 
significant differences in performance between treatments (Kruskal-Wallis test). This was to 
be expected since Stages 1 and 2 are identical across treatments. 
 
Figure 1 and Table 2 about here 
 
3.2. Competition entry choices (Stage 3) 
Figure 2 shows the relative frequency with which men and women choose to compete 
in Stage 3 (instead of choosing the piece rate scheme). Similar to the results reported in 
Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) and Niederle et al. (2009) we find that in the control 
treatment CTR men compete about twice as often as women. However, the four different 
policy interventions reduce, and even reverse, this gender gap. Overall, the relative frequency 
of women opting for competition is increasing from left to right in Figure 2, from 30.6% in 
CTR to 69.4% in PT2. Judging by a Chi²-test, the differences across treatments are highly 
significant (p < 0.01). Bilateral comparisons reveal that the frequency of competing women in 
CTR is significantly smaller than in PT1 or PT2 (p < 0.05), and weakly significantly smaller 
than in QUO (p < 0.1). Repetition of the competition (REP) is the only policy intervention 
that has no significant effect on women’s entry choices. 
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
While the fraction of men choosing competition is generally decreasing from left to 
right in Figure 2, there is no significant difference across treatments (Chi²-test). Hence, the   9
main impact of the different policy interventions is on women’s choices, not on the choices of 
men. In the following we analyze the reasons for the policies’ consequences. 
 
3.2.1. Probabilities of winning and actual versus optimal entry choices 
First we calculate the probabilities of winning the tournament in Stage 3, conditional 
on gender and a subject’s performance in Stage 2. For this purpose we draw 10,000 samples 
of groups of six members (3 men and 3 women; with replacement). The sampling is repeated 
100 times and the average probability of winning is calculated for each member conditional 
on his/her performance in Stage 2, given the rule for determining the winners (CTR, REP, 
QUO, PT1 or PT2). The resulting probabilities are shown in Table 3. 
 
Table 3 and Table 4 about here 
 
Given these probabilities, we can derive the payoff-maximizing entry choices and 
compare them with the actually observed entry choices. Assuming risk neutrality, entering the 
competition is payoff-maximizing if a subject’s probability of winning the competition is 
larger than one third. This approach yields the number of subjects that should enter 
competition in Stage 3 as shown in Table 4 in rows “Payoff maximizing”. Below these rows 
we report the actual number of men, respectively women, who entered the competition. We 
see from Table 4 that men always enter too often, and that the difference between the payoff-
maximizing and the actual number of entrants is significant in three out of five treatments (p < 
0.05, McNemar test). For women we do not find significant differences between the payoff-
maximizing and the actual number of entrants, though. Rather, their choices are by and large 
consistent with conditional payoff maximization. 
 
3.2.2. Econometric analysis of entry choices in the different treatments 
In Table 5 we analyze the determinants of entry choices using a probit regression 
(marginal effects with robust standard errors; all findings are robust to individual random 
effects). The decision to enter the competition in Stage 3 (1 if a subject chooses competition, 
0 otherwise) is regressed on a gender dummy, the four treatment dummies, the interactions 
between gender and treatments, and the following controls: A subject’s competitive 
performance in Stage 2 is taken into account by variable correct2, measuring the number of 
correct answers in Stage 2. The variable guesswin is constructed from a subject’s beliefs about 
his/her performance in Stage 2 and it takes on the value 1 if a subject has reported in his/her   10
beliefs either rank 1 or rank 2 for Stage 2, and 0 otherwise.
6 The variable probwin represents a 
subject’s expected probability of winning the tournament conditional on her Stage 2 
performance, taken from Table 3. Hence, while probwin measures the ex ante probability of a 
subject winning the tournament in Stage 3, guesswin captures the perceived probability of 
winning (provided that subjects do not expect their relative performance to be different 
between Stages 2 and 3). 
 
Table 5 about here 
 
In column (1) of Table 5 we only control for the number of correct answers in Stage 2 
(which has a positive effect on the likelihood to choose competition in Stage 3), but not for 
the probabilities of winning. We find a significant gender gap, indicated by the significantly 
negative female dummy. We also see that the interaction of female with treatment PT2 is 
significantly positive, thus counterbalancing the negative gender gap in the control treatment 
CTR. This indicates an overshooting of women’s entry decisions when the preferential 
treatment is strong. In column (2) we add guesswin, a subject’s belief about winning the 
competition, and find that this renders the gender dummy female insignificant. The reason for 
that is the fact that women have significantly different beliefs about their rank than men. 
While 58.3% of men indicate in their beliefs a rank of 1 or 2 (meaning they expect to win), 
this proportion is only 38.9% for women (p < 0.05, Chi²-test). Hence, the negative gender gap 
in column (1) is mainly driven by different beliefs of men and women.
7 
In column (3) we add probwin as an explanatory variable. Since probwin and correct2 
are very highly correlated by construction of probwin (Spearman’s rho = 0.92, p < 0.01), we 
exclude correct2 from this specification, as we would run into problems of multicollinearity 
otherwise. Using probwin instead of correct2 does not change any of the main results 
established so far. In columns (4) and (5) we break down the analysis of column (3) by 
gender, confirming that both male and female subjects respond to changes in the (actual and 
                                                            
6 If, instead of this binary measure of perceived beliefs, we use the ordinal rank in our regressions all our results 
stay qualitatively the same. 
7 It may be interesting to note that gender differences in beliefs about winning the competition in Stage 2 are not 
driven by men being more overconfident. Recall that men have a significantly better performance in Stage 2 
than women. Comparing their actual ranks with their expected ranks, we find an overconfidence of 0.53 ranks 
on average for men (p < 0.01, two-sided t-test), but we also find an overconfidence of 0.39 ranks on average 
for women (p < 0.01, two-sided t-test). The difference in overconfidence of men and women is not significant 
(p > 0.2).   11
perceived) probability of winning the competition.
8 For both men and women there are no 
residual effects of any policy intervention, except for women entering significantly more often 
in PT2 even after controlling for the probabilities of winning. 
Overall, the results in columns (1) to (5) of Table 5 suggest that the (actual and 
perceived) probabilities of winning the competition can explain the differences in competition 
entry choices in Stage 3 so that – after controlling for these probabilities – there is no 
statistically significant residual gender gap in entry decisions (with an overreaction of female 
participants to the strong preferential treatment PT2, though). However, this overall result is 
driven by our treatments with a policy intervention and, therefore, masks the gender gap that 
still persists in the control treatment CTR. Using only data for CTR, we find that women 




3.3. Efficiency in selecting the best candidates as winners (Stages 3 and 4) 
Policy interventions that promote the entry of women may have two opposing effects 
on the overall efficiency in selecting the best candidates as winners. On the one hand any 
policy intervention that gives an advantage to women (like in QUO, PT1 and PT2) may yield 
efficiency losses by passing by better performing men for the sake of promoting women. We 
call this potential effect the selection effect of policy interventions. On the other hand policy 
interventions may induce more high-performing women to choose competition instead of 
going for the piece rate. What we call the entry effect of policy interventions may lead to 
efficiency gains. Whichever effect prevails is open to empirical examination. 
Table 6 shows for each treatment the average Stage 1-performance of those subjects 
who have entered and won the competition in Stage 3. We use the winners’ performances in 
Stage 1 as an appropriate measure of a subject’s ability, because this performance is 
unaffected by competition and any policy intervention.
10 The winners’ average performance is 
better than in the control treatment CTR in three out of the four treatments with a policy 
intervention. A Kruskal-Wallis test shows that the differences across treatments are far from 
                                                            
8 Including the interactions of probwin and guesswin with the female dummy in column (3) would not lead to 
any notable changes in the results, as the interaction terms are insignificant and indicate that the effects of the 
probability of winning and of beliefs are not conditional on gender. This can also be seen from columns (4) 
and (5) by the small differences between the coefficients of probwin and guesswin for men and women. 
9 We can replicate the significant gender gap in CTR even when we control for subjective beliefs and the actual 
probability of winning, by running a regression of the decision to enter competition in Stage 3 on female, 
guesswin and correct2 and using only data for CTR: female is negative and significant in this regression (p < 
0.05) 
10 We obtain very similar results if we use performances in Stage 3 as our measure of ability (or performances in 
Stage 4; see Table 7 and the associated discussion).   12
being significant (p > 0.7), nor are any pairwise comparisons close to that (p > 0.2 for all 
pairwise comparisons, Mann-Whitney U-tests). These findings suggest that the entry effect 
and the selection effect balance out in the aggregate. 
 
Table 6 and Figure 3 about here 
 
Next, we have a closer look at the entry and the selection effect. Figure 3 plots in panel 
(a) the proportion of all subjects who choose to enter the competition in Stage 3, conditional 
on their performance in Stage 1. We classify Stage 1-performance as weak (less than four 
correct answers), intermediate (4 to 7 correct answers) or strong (more than 7 correct 
answers).
11 What we see from panel (a) is the fact that our four different policy interventions 
increase the likelihood of weak and strong performers entering the competition – always 
compared with CTR as benchmark – while they have no effect on the intermediate 
performers. 
Panel (b) shows the same graph for women, indicating that the policy measures have a 
positive effect on competition entry for all types of female performers (with a negligible 
exception for intermediate performers in REP). The increase in competition entry by strong 
female performers shows the potential of policy interventions to increase efficiency (the entry 
effect). 
Panel (c) presents the reaction of men to policy interventions. We see that in particular 
intermediate performers (with 4 to 7 correct answers) are discouraged from entering 
competition – especially in treatment PT2 –, while strong male performers (with more than 7 
correct answers) do not respond to policy interventions in a negative way, compared to CTR 
as benchmark. 
Turning to the role of the selection effect for tournament efficiency, we present in 
Table 7 the average Stage 1-performance of the two winners in Stage 4 – where all 
participants had to compete. There is no significant difference across all treatments (p > 0.30, 
Kruskal-Wallis test), nor in pairwise comparisons to CTR (p > 0.18 in all cases, Mann-
Whitney U-tests). This absence of an efficiency-decreasing selection effect is largely due to 
the fact that hardly any better-qualified men were passed by in the treatments with policy 
interventions. In treatment REP there was no single instance in which the competition had to 
be repeated in Stage 4, meaning that no better-qualified men could have been passed by. In 
                                                            
11 This was done in order to have more observations in each category. The resulting patterns are qualitatively the 
same if we use a larger number of categories, or if we plot the proportions for each possible performance level.   13
treatment QUO there were three cases where a man performed better by one unit but lost to 
the best woman, and two cases where a man performed better by four units but lost to the best 
woman. Finally, in only one out of 12 groups in PT1 (PT2) a man performed better by one 
unit (two units) and lost. 
 
Table 7 about here 
 
3.4. Post-competition efficiency I: The team task (Stage 5) 
Recall that we examine two different post-competition tasks: one where the group 
members’ efforts are substitutes (in the team task in Stage 5) – which entails incentives for 
shirking – and one where group production has a weakest-link production function in the form 
of a minimum effort game (in Stage 6) – where the problem is how to coordinate efficiently. 
We start our analysis of post-competition efficiency with the team task. 
 
Figure 4 about here 
 
In Figure 4 we present the average total output as the sum of correct answers in a 
group in Stage 5 of the experiment. From an organizational point of view a higher output is 
more efficient. It is interesting to note that total output is higher in any of the treatments 
where group members had experienced a policy intervention in Stages 3 and 4 than in the 
control treatment CTR. Pooling all treatments with a policy intervention (i.e., REP, QUO, 
PT1 and PT2) and testing against CTR yields a significantly higher output in the former set 
of treatments (48.4 vs. 44.5; p < 0.05, two-sided Mann-Whitney U-test).
12 More specifically, 
the highest output is achieved in treatment PT2, with a significant difference in a pairwise 
comparison to CTR  (p  < 0.05, Mann-Whitney test). We also find a weakly significant 
difference between QUO and CTR (p < 0.1). 
We had conjectured that in particular men who had expected to win, but had actually 
lost a competition might withhold effort in Stage 5. In order to identify this set of men, we 
look at reported beliefs about Stage 2 rankings. Since the only difference between Stages 2 
and 4 is policy (and given that there is no feedback on true relative performance before Stage 
5), it is natural to assume that a man who thinks he has won in Stage 2 also thinks that he 
would win in Stage 4 unless he is disadvantaged by policy. Considering those men who 
                                                            
12 Pooling of the treatments with a policy intervention is possible here since there are no significant Stage 5 
differences among these treatments (p > 0.4,, Kruskal-Wallis test).   14
expected to be first or second in their group in Stage 2, but who actually lost in Stage 4, leads 
to an interesting result: On average, male losers who expected to win have a higher Stage 5-
performance in all policy intervention-treatments compared to CTR (7.83 vs. 6.64), and this 
difference is significant in the case of PT2 (p < 0.05, two-sided Mann-Whitney U-test). The 
increase in male losers’ performance could be part of an effort of those men who lost the 
tournament in Stage 4 to compensate for foregone payoffs (by working harder now) or 
demonstrate to their group that they would have deserved to win. 
It is noteworthy that in the control treatment CTR men who thought they should have 
won, but actually lost, are slightly withholding effort, comparing performance in Stages 4 and 
5 (7.0 vs. 6.64 correct answers). In contrast to this withholding of effort, the performance of 
men who expected to win, but lost, increases from Stage 4 and Stage 5 on average in all 
treatments where a policy intervention applied (7.35 vs. 7.83). This increase is, in fact, 
significant in PT2 (p < 0.05, two-sided Wilcoxon signed ranks test). 
For women we find no effects of policy interventions on their behavior in Stage 5. 
There is no significant difference across treatments in the Stage 5-performance of female 
winners, irrespective of whether they had expected to win or lose in Stage 2 (Kruskal-Wallis 
test). Similarly, we find no significant change in female losers’ performance from Stage 4 to 
Stage 5, whether or not they had expected to win or lose. In sum, the evidence from the team 
task suggests that policy interventions may even be beneficial for team production, and 
mainly so because men increase their efforts. 
 
3.5. Post-competition efficiency II: The minimum effort game (Stage 6) 
Our second measure of post-tournament efficiency is a group’s total payoff from the 
minimum effort game in Stage 6. We consider the sum of payoffs that all six group members 
would earn if every pairwise game were paid. The maximum total payoff would be €195, if 
all group members always chose an effort level of “7”. The minimum total payoff would be 
€60. This would apply if in each pair there would be one player choosing “1”, and the other 
“7”, yielding an average payoff of €2 per subject and interaction. Hence, the total sum of 
payoffs in a group can be considered as an indicator of efficiency in a coordination task like 
the minimum effort game. 
 
Figure 5 about here 
   15
Figure 5 shows the average total payoffs in a group in the different treatments. While 
they differ slightly – fluctuating around €150 – there is no significant difference across 
treatments (p  > 0.6, Kruskal-Wallis test) and also no significant pairwise differences in 
comparison to the control treatment CTR.
13 This leads us to conclude that, in the aggregate, 
introducing any of our policy measures does not entail efficiency losses in the minimum effort 
game. 
Taken together, our results from Stages 4, 5 and 6 allow us to conclude that our policy 
interventions of minimum quotas, weak or strong preferential treatment, and repetition of the 
tournament do not entail any efficiency losses, neither in the selection of winners in the 
competition stage, nor in two different team tasks in post-competition stages. On the contrary, 
we have even found evidence that total team performance in the team task of Stage 5 is larger 




Motivated by recent findings on the lower level of competitiveness of women (Gneezy 
et al., 2003, 2009; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; Niederle et al., 2009) we have examined in 
an experiment several types of policy interventions that are intended to promote women in 
competition by either giving them a head-start over men or by considering quotas when 
determining the winners of contests. The main targets of our study have been to examine the 
effects of the different intervention forms on (1) women’s willingness to enter a competition 
and the efficiency in selecting the best candidates as winners in the competition, and (2) the 
behavior in two non-competitive group tasks after the competition. 
In our experiment we have studied the effects of a weak and a strong form of 
preferential treatment (by giving women a smaller or larger head-start over men), the 
introduction of a minimum quota for female winners, and the repetition of the competition if a 
certain number of female winners is not reached. With respect to our first target we have 
found that both forms of preferential treatment (PT1 and PT2) as well as the implementation 
of a minimum quota for female winners (QUO) have increased women’s willingness to enter 
competition significantly. The strong form of preferential treatment has more than doubled the 
                                                            
13 There are no significant gender differences in effort choices across treatments either, and also no differences in 
effort choices of winners and losers of the competition in Stage 4. However, an interesting observation is that 
subjects are systematically more cooperative (i.e., choose higher numbers) when they are matched with 
someone of the opposite sex. This is true for both men and women, and in all five treatments (p < 0.01, Mann-
Whitney tests).   16
entry rates of women. Hence, if an increase in the number of women entering competition is 
the overarching goal, then the strong form of preferential treatment is the preferred policy 
intervention. It seems that only the (in the German speaking area often applied) procedure of 
repeating a competition if women are not among the winners (for example by being 
shortlisted for positions in the public sector) does not have a significant impact on women’s 
competition entry choices (REP). Overall, we can conclude, however, that women react 
systematically in their entry choices to policy interventions that are intended to promote them 
in tournaments. The main reasons for this reaction are the positive effects of these policy 
interventions on the actual and expected probabilities of winning the competition. Controlling 
for these probabilities we have seen that the policy interventions themselves have no 
significant effect on female entry choices, except for the strong preferential treatment PT2 
that leads to an excess entry of women. This is an indication that policy interventions might 
overshoot, thereby inducing inefficiently high entry rates of women into tournaments. In 
contrast to women, we have found that men react much less (negatively) – and insignificantly 
– to the different types of policy interventions. In a sense this finding is compatible with men 
enjoying competition – even if they are objectively disadvantaged. 
As far as the efficiency in selecting the best qualified candidates as winners in the 
competition is concerned, it is comforting to note that none of the four policy interventions 
studied here had a negative effect in comparison to a control treatment. It seems that the 
higher entry rates of highly qualified women – combined with the fact that policy 
interventions have only a weak and insignificant negative effect on men’s entry choices – is 
responsible for avoiding efficiency losses through measures that can potentially pass by better 
qualified men. None of our four different policy interventions has been found better or worse 
compared to each other, indicating that several different forms of affirmative action may yield 
roughly the same results with respect to efficiency in selecting winners. What we have found 
in a unified framework confirms the earlier findings of Niederle et al. (2009) and Calsamiglia 
et al. (2009) for particular forms of affirmative action. 
Our second target has been to study how different forms of affirmative action 
influence post-competition behavior in groups when group members are expected to 
cooperate and coordinate efficiently. To the best of our knowledge, this issue has not been 
studied before under controlled conditions. We have chosen two different, non-competitive 
tasks to study post-competition behavior. Both tasks are representative for different types of 
production functions in teamwork. The team task treats each group member’s effort as 
substitute for another member’s effort, while the minimum effort game is a specific form of a   17
weakest-link production function. Studying both types of non-competitive tasks is motivated 
by the observation that while internal promotions in companies (through contests for better 
jobs) yield winners and losers, it is often necessary that winners and losers work together also 
after the contest. Different forms of policy interventions may have different effects on 
teamwork after the contest then. The fear that policy interventions might backfire on 
efficiency after the contest is unwarranted, though, as our findings show. In the coordination 
task we find no significant difference across all five treatments. However, in the team task we 
even find significantly higher output in the treatments with policy interventions than in the 
control treatment. 
In sum, our findings seem to us like good news for companies and policy makers 
alike, provided that they have an interest in supporting women in competitive environments 
through various forms of affirmative action. While such interventions have – not 
unexpectedly – positive effects on the willingness of women to expose themselves to a 
competitive situation, they have – less expectedly – no negative effects on the efficiency of 
selecting the best candidates, they are not associated with efficiency losses from coordination 
failure, and they even have positive effects on productivity in a team task that had to be 
performed after the conclusion of the competition. Hence, affirmative action programs 
promoting women can have a double dividend, and this holds particularly true for the three 
forms of affirmative action (QUO, PT1, PT2) that have significantly positive effects on the 
decision of women to enter competition.  
   18
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1. Payoff matrix in the minimum effort game (Stage 6). 
  Minimum of the two numbers in a pair (including your number) 
  7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
7  €6.50 €5.50 €4.50 €3.50 €2.50 €1.50 €0.50 
6    €6.00 €5.00 €4.00 €3.00 €2.00 €1.00 
5    €5.50  €4.50  €3.50  €2.50  €1.50 
4     €5.00  €4.00  €3.00  €2.00 
3      €4.50  €3.50  €2.50 
2       €4.00  €3.00 
Your number 





Table 2. Average performance (# correct answers) and standard deviation by stage, 
treatment and gender. 
  CTR REP QUO PT1  PT2 
  Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men  Women 
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Table 3. Probability of winning the tournament in Stage 3, conditional on Stage 2 
performance. 
Stage 2 performance 





















Men  0.01 0.07 0.24 0.48 0.68 0.82 0.91 0.97 0.99 1.00 
CTR 
Women 0.01 0.06 0.22 0.45 0.66 0.79 0.89 0.96 0.99 1.00 
Men  0.01 0.07 0.21 0.47 0.66 0.81 0.90 0.97 0.99 1.00 
REP 
Women 0.01 0.07 0.28 0.53 0.74 0.86 0.94 0.98 1.00 1.00 
Men  0.01 0.04 0.14 0.31 0.48 0.61 0.72 0.82 0.91 0.96 
QUO 
Women 0.07 0.19 0.37 0.58 0.75 0.85 0.91 0.97 0.99 1.00 
Men  0.00 0.03 0.13 0.33 0.56 0.74 0.85 0.94 0.96 1.00 
PT1 
Women 0.03 0.14 0.35 0.57 0.74 0.85 0.94 0.98 1.00 1.00 
Men  0.00 0.01 0.05 0.19 0.40 0.62 0.78 0.89 0.96 0.99 
PT2 







Table 4. Number of subjects (out of 36) entering competition in Stage 3. 
 CTR  REP  QUO  PT1  PT2 
Payoff  maximizing  (men)  13  15 17 10 13 
Actual  (men)  23  24 22 20 18 
p-value (McNemar test)  0.01  0.03 0.20 0.00 0.13 
Payoff  maximizing  (women) 12  15 13 23 19 
Actual  (women)  11  14 19 21 25 
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Table 5. Probit regressions with entry choice into competition as dependent variable 
(Stage 3). 
  (1) All  (2) All  (3) All  (4) Men  (5) Women 




























female*PT2   0.435 ** 
(0,073) 
 0.411 ** 
(0,085) 
 0.376 ** 
(0,098) 
  






































 0.326 ** 
(0,106) 
correct2   0.047 ** 
(0,011) 
 0.028 * 
(0,011) 
    
guesswin     0.348 ** 
(0,055) 
 0.346 ** 
(0,055) 
 0.358 ** 
(0,077) 
 0.332 ** 
(0,078) 
probwin       0.266 **  
(0,089) 
 0.243 * 
(0,125) 
 0.286 * 
(0,126) 
Pseudo R
2   0.086   0.158   0.162   0.142   0.172 
Prob>chi2   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000 
N   360   360   360   180   180 
* (**) … significant at the 5% (1%) level. The table reports marginal effects. 
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Table 6. Tournament efficiency – Average Stage 1-performance of the 
winners in Stage 3, by treatment. 
CTR  7.79 
REP  8.17 
QUO  8.56 
PT1  8.38 





Table 7. Selection effect – Average Stage 1-performance of the winners 
in Stage 4, by treatment. 
CTR  8.13 
REP  7.42 
QUO  8.33 
PT1  9.13 
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Figure 3. Relative frequency of entering competition in Stage 3, conditional on 
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Appendix: Experimental Instructions (not intended for publication) 
 
[General instructions, at start of session] 
 
Welcome to an experiment on decision making. We thank you for your participation! 
 
During the experiment, you and the other participants will be asked to make certain decisions. Your 
own decisions as well as the decisions of the other participants will determine your payment from the 
experiment, according to the rules that will be described in what follows. 
  The experiment will be conducted on the computer. You make your decisions on the screen. 
All decisions and answers will remain confidential and anonymous. 
  The experiment consists of 6 stages. One of the first four stages (1-4) and one of the last two 
stages (5-6) will be randomly selected for your payment: At the end of the experiment we will use a 
lottery wheel to determine which stages will be relevant for your payment. Your total earnings from 
the experiment will be the sum of your payments for the randomly selected stages, plus a show up fee 
of € 3. 
  You will receive instructions for each of the six stages, one after the other. We will read the 
instructions aloud and then give you time for questions. Please do not hesitate to ask questions if 
anything is not clear. 
  Please do not talk to each other during the experiment. If you have any questions, please raise 
your hand. 
 
Stage 1: Piece rate 
Your task in stage 1 is to solve correctly as many addition exercises as possible. To be more precise, 
you will have 3 minutes’s time in order to solve as many additions of five randomly selected two-digit 
numbers as possible, by entering the sum of the five numbers.You are not allowed to use calculators 
but you can write down the numbers and use the provided scribbling paper for your calculations. You 
enter an answer by clicking with the mouse on the “Confirm” button. When you enter an answer, you 
immediately find out on the screen whether it was correct or not. 
  If stage 1 is the stage selected for payment (among stages 1-4), then you will receive €0.50 
(i.e., 50 cent) for each correct answer that you entered within the 3 minutes. Your payment is not 
reduced when you enter a wrong answer. From now on, we call this method of payment the Piece-rate 
payment. 
  Directly before the start of this stage you will be given one minute in order to familiarize 
yourselves with the screen: During this time you can solve addition exercises, which do not count for 
the experiment. Afterwards, stage 1 will begin. 
   28
Stage 2: Tournament 
 
As in stage 1, you will have 3 minutes’ time in order to solve correctly as many addition exercises as 
possible. However, your payment in this stage depends on your performance relative to the 
performance of a group of participants. 
 
Allocation in groups: Each group consists of 6 participants, 3 of whom are men and 3 are 
women. Groups are randomly formed at the beginning of this stage and each participant stays in the 
same group until the end of the experiment. 
Each group member receives an identification code. All members keep their identification code for the 
entire experiment. The 3 women receive randomly the identification code F1, F2 or F3. The 3 men 
receive randomly the identification code M1, M2 or M3. You will not find out the identity of the 
other participants in your group during or after the experiment, so that all decisions remain 
anonymous. 
  If stage 2 is the stage selected for payment (among stages 1-4), then your payment depends on 
how many additions you have solved correctly in comparison with the other five participants in your 
group. The two group members who have entered the most correct answers are the two winners of the 
tournament. The two winners receive €1.50 per correct answer each, while the other four members 
do not receive any payment. In case of a tie, the ranking among the members with equal 
performances is determined randomly. From now on, we call this method of payment the Tournament 
payment. 
  You will not be informed about the outcome of the tournament until the end of the experiment. 
 
Tournament, format B [Preferential treatment only – PT2 {PT1}] 
Before the start of the next stage we explain the rules of the tournament, format B, from now on called 
“Tournament-B”. 
  The only difference between the Tournament-B, and the tournament in stage 2 is the 
following: In the Tournament-B, the number of every woman’s correctly solved exercises is 
automatically increased by 2. This means for example that, if a woman has entered 8 correct answers, 
her performance in the Tournament-B counts as 10 correct answers. In each group, all 3 women 
receive two {one} additional points each, while the 3 men receive no additional points. As in stage 2, 
the two winners of the Tournament-B are then the two group members with the best performances 
(taking the additional points for women into account). In case of a tie, the ranking among the members 
with equal performances is again determined randomly. 
 
Tournament, format B [Quotas only - QUO] 
Before the start of the next stage we explain the rules of the tournament, format B, from now on called 
“Tournament-B”.   29
  In the Tournament-B, the two winners are determined as follows. In each group, one of the 
two winners is in any case the woman with the best performance (of all three women). The other 
winner is the group member with the best performance among the remaining members (i.e., excluding 
the best-performing woman). 
  We now give a concrete example, in order to illustrate the way that the winners are determined 
in the Tournament-B. We order the six group members according to their performance within each 
gender, so that fA is the woman with the best performance, fB is the woman with the second-best 
performance and fC the woman with the third-best performance. In the same way, mA is the man with 
the best performance, mB is the man with the second-best performance, and mC the man with the 
third-best performance. The woman with the best performance, fA, is definitely one of two winners in 
a Tournament-B. In order to determine the second winner, we must find out who is the person with the 
best performance among the remaining five group members (besides fA). Since there is only one more 
winner, this can either be fB or mA, depending on their performance.  
  To sum up: A woman wins a Tournament-B if she has the best performance among all women 
or if she is one of the two persons with the highest performance within her group. A man wins a 
Tournament-B if he is the man with the best performance and at the same time one of the two persons 
with the highest performance within his group. So there is at least one woman and at most one man as 
winners in a Tournament-B. 
 
Tournament, format B [Repetition only - REP] 
Before the start of the next stage we explain the rules of the tournament, format B, from now on called 
“Tournament-B”. 
  The only difference between the Tournament-B, and the tournament in stage 2 is the 
following: If both winners in the Tournament-B are male, then the tournament is repeated once. The 
outcome of the second tournament only determines then, who the two winners are. 
  Thus, if there is at least one woman among the two winners of a Tournament-B, then the 
outcome is final. If both winners are men, then the tournament is repeated once. The repeated 
tournament is like the first one, i.e., the winners are the two group members who have entered the 
most correct answers. The outcome of the repeated tournament is final, even if for example both 
winners are men. 
 
 
Stage 3: Choice between Piece-rate payment and Tournament-B payment 
 
[In control treatment: Replace Tournament-B with Tournament] 
As in stages 1 and 2, you will have 3 minutes’ time in order to solve correctly as many addition 
exercises as possible. However, you must now choose yourself your preferred payment method for 
your performance in stage 3. You can either choose the Piece-rate payment (as in stage 1) or the 
Tournament-B payment.     30
  If stage 2 is the stage selected for payment (among stages 1-4), then your payment is 
determined as follows: 
•  If you choose the Piece-rate payment, then you will receive €0.50 per correct answer 
•  If you choose the Tournament-B payment, then your performance in stage 3 will be 
evaluated in comparison to the performance of the other five group members in stage 2 
(Tournament). As a reminder: That is the stage that you have just completed. If you enter 
more correct answers than four of your group members did in stage 2, then you will receive 
€1.50 per correct answer (i.e., 3 times the Piece-rate payment). In other words, only one 
member of your group can have a stage 2- performance which is higher than your stage 3- 
performance, otherwise you receive no payment for this stage. [Preferential treatment only: 
As we have already explained, the performances of all women in the Tournament-B are 
automatically increased by two correctly solved exercises. The additional points are taken 
into account for the determination of the two winners, but not for the payment. This is true for 
the performances of women in stage 3, but also for the performances from stage 2 which are 
used for comparison.] [Repetition only: As we have already explained, the Tournament-B is 
repeated once if both winners are men. This means that those persons who choose the 
Tournament-B payment may have to participate in a tournament twice.] [Quotas only: The 
instructions for women are: You receive € 1.50 per correct answer if you have a better stage 
3- performance than (i) the other two women in your group in stage 2, or (ii) four members of 
your group in stage 2. The instructions for men are: You receive € 1.50 per correct answer if 
you have a better performance than (i) the other two men in your group in stage 2, and (ii) 
four members of your group in stage 2.] 
 
In case of a tie, the ranking among the members with equal performances is again determined 
randomly. 
  The group composition (with 3 men and 3 women) is as in stage 2. If you choose the 
Tournament-B payment, you will not be informed about the outcome of the tournament until the end 
of the experiment. 
  On the next screen you will be asked whether you want to choose the Piece-rate payment or 
the Tournament-B payment for your performance in stage 3. Afterwards you will have 3 minutes in 
order to calculate the sums of the two-digit numbers. 
 
Stage 4: Tournament-B 
 
As before, you will have 3 minutes’ time in order to solve correctly as many addition exercises as 
possible. The group composition (with 3 men and 3 women) is the same as before. 
[In treatment PT2 {PT1}: The rules of the Tournament-B in this stage are as we have already 
described them in stage 3: The number of every woman’s correctly solved exercises is automatically 
increased by 2 {1}. Hence, the only difference compared with stage 3 is that you now do not have a 
choice between the Piece-rate and the Tournament-B payment: All group members compete 
simultaneously in the Tournament-B.] 
[In treatment QUO: The rules of the Tournament-B in this stage are as we have already described 
them in stage 3: In each group, one of the two winners is in any case the woman with the best 
performance (among all three women). Hence, the only difference compared with stage 3 is that you   31
now do not have a choice between the Piece-rate and the Tournament-B payment: All group members 
compete simultaneously in the Tournament-B.] 
[In treatment REP: The rules of the Tournament-B in this stage are as we have already described 
them in stage 3: If both winners in the Tournament-B are male, then the tournament is repeated once. 
Hence, the only difference compared with stage 3 is that you now do not have a choice between the 
Piece-rate and the Tournament-B payment: All group members compete simultaneously in the 
Tournament-B.] 
[In control treatment: The tournament in this stage is exactly as in stage 2: The winners are the two 
group members who enter the most correct answers.] 
 
If stage 4 is the stage selected for payment (among stages 1-4), then the two winners receive €1.50 per 
correct answer each, while the other four members of the group receive no payment. In case of a tie, 
the ranking among the members with equal performances is again determined randomly. 
  Furthermore, the tournament in this stage also serves the purpose of determining the initial 
endowment of every group member in the next two stages (5 and 6). This is done as follows: The two 
winners of stage 4 receive then in stages 5 and 6 an initial endowment of €5.00 each; the other four 
group members (i.e., the non-winners) receive an initial endowment of €2.00 each in each of the next 
two stages. This endowment is only paid out for that stage (between stages 5 and 6) which is randomly 
selected for payment at the end of the experiment. 
  At the end of this stage you will be informed about the outcome of the tournament and thereby 
about your initial endowment in the next two stages. This means that all members in each group will 




In stage 5, the two winners of the tournament in stage 4 have an endowment of € 5; the non-winners 
have an endowment of € 2. 
  As in stages 1-4, you will have 3 minutes’ time in order to solve correctly as many addition 
exercises as possible. The group composition (with 3 men and 3 women) is the same as before. 
However, your payment for this stage depends on your performance as well as on the total 
performance of all other members in your group. 
  To be more precise, your payment is determined as folows: You receive 8.33 euro cent for 
each correct answer that a member of your group has entered in the 3 minutes. This means that each 
correct answer is worth €0.50 for the entire group (i.e., all 6 members). It also means that all 
members of a group receive the same payment in this stage, and this depends only on the total 
performance of the group, i.e., on the sum of all correct answers of the 6 group members. 
  If stage 5 is the stage selected for payment (between stages 5-6), then your payment is the sum 
of your endowment and your payoff from the performance of your group.    32
  At the end of the experiment you will be informed about the total performance of your group 




In stage 6, the two winners of the tournament in stage 4 have an endowment of € 5; the non-winners 
have an endowment of € 2. 
  In stage 6, pairs are formed within each group. Each pair consists of two persons. In this way, 
every participant belongs to five pairs, i.e., each time with one of the other five members of his (her) 
group. 
  In this stage you must make a decision by selecting one of the numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, or 7. 
Your payment depends on your own number as well as on the number selected by the other person that 
you are paired with. This is done as follows: In the table below you see in rows (left) the number that 
you have selected. In the columns (up) you see the minimum between your number and the number 
selected by the other person in your pair. The amounts in the cells are your profit, dependent on your 
number and on the minimum of the two numbers in your pair. 
 
  Minimum of the two numbers in a pair 
   7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
7  €6.50 €5.50 €4.50 €3.50 €2.50 €1.50 €0.50 
6    €6.00 €5.00 €4.00 €3.00 €2.00 €1.00 
5    €5.50  €4.50  €3.50  €2.50  €1.50 
4     €5.00  €4.00  €3.00  €2.00 
3      €4.50  €3.50  €2.50 
2       €4.00  €3.00 
Your number 
1        €3.50 
 
Example 1: Suppose you select the number 6 and the other person in your pair selects the number 4. 
Then 4 is the minimum between these two numbers. From the table it follows that your profit is € 4, 
while the profit of the other person is € 5.  
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Example 2: Suppose you select the number 2 and the other person in your pair selects the number 5. 
Then 2 is the minimum between these two numbers. From the table it follows that your profit is € 4, 
while the profit of the other person is € 2.50.  
 
Example 3: Suppose you select the number 3 and the other person in your pair also selects the number 
3. Then 3 also is the minimum between these two numbers. From the table it follows that your profit is 
€ 4.50, and the profit of the other person is also € 4.50.  
 
  The concrete procedure in this stage is as folows: You will be asked on the screen to make five 
decisions, one for your interaction with each of the other members of your group. For each decision 
you will be informed on-screen with which group member you playing (identified by means of the 
identification code). You will, however, not find out which number (s)he has chosen, before you make 
your own choice. In other words, the two persons in each pair make their decisions simultaneously. 
  For your payment in this stage one of the five pairs, to which you belong, will be randomly 
selected. If stage 6 is the stage selected for payment (between stages 5-6), then your payment is the 
sum of your endowment and your payoff based on the above table. 
  At the end of the experiment you will be informed about the decision of the other person in the 
pair that is relevant for your payment, und thereby about your payoff from this stage. However, you 
will not find out anything about the decisions in the other pairs (to which you do not belong). 
 
 
 